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Bad students learning 
the wrong lessons?
Roger MacGinty
PREMATURE HISTORY?
Sitting at the LSE IDEAS ‘Lessons of Northern Ireland’ event, it was fanciful to think of ‘who was bugging who’ during the peace process. Around the table at the seminar we had 
Jonathan Powell (Tony Blair’s chief of staff for the Northern Ireland talks), Martin Mansergh 
(the Irish Taoiseach’s special representative on the Northern Ireland talks), Tim Dalton (from 
the Irish Ministry of Justice who collated Irish government intelligence files), David Trimble 
(the former leader of the Ulster Unionist Party and a leading player in the peace process), 
and Barbara de Bruin (a member of Sinn Féin’s negotiating team). Is it beyond the bounds of 
possibility that Jonathan Powell, or Tim Dalton, were privy to the transcripts of telephone calls 
and other surreptitiously recorded conversations of the people with whom they now shared 
a seminar room? My educated guess would be that Jonathan, Tim and many others know a 
lot more than they are prepared, or allowed, to tell us. 
This gets to the heart of the matter of the lessons to be learned from a peace process: what information 
is available to allow us to draw lessons? Some information is in the public domain, and other information 
is not. But even the information that is in the public domain may not be as helpful as we imagine. There 
is a difference between having access to information and identifying those parts of that information 
that might be useful to others. 
There has been no shortage of politicians, policymakers and academics (myself included) travelling the 
world to explain the ‘lessons’ from the Northern Ireland peace process. But it is worth asking if we 
are in a position to identify ‘lessons’ from the Northern Ireland peace process? A number of barriers 
mean that politicians, policymakers, journalists, and academics may not be able to learn from Northern 
Ireland’s peace process in any meaningful way. Instead, there is a danger that many of the lessons that 
are shared are superficial and glib. 
Perhaps the most prominent of these barriers relates to the instant history that accompanied the Northern 
Ireland peace process. There has been no shortage of memoirs, insider accounts, television documentaries, 
and learned wisdom from telegenic historians. This is not a criticism of the politicians, policymakers, 
journalists, and academics who have given us insights to the Northern Ireland peace process. Many of the 
insider accounts make gripping reading and are invaluable sources of information. The problem is that 
a largely accepted version of the peace process was laid down very early, more or less in real time. This 
narrative has become hegemonic. Indeed, key players in the peace process (individuals and institutions) 
invest considerable energy in maintaining this accepted narrative, and their crucial role in it. Thus, those 
who made the peace process, have become gatekeepers to a particular narrative of the peace process. 
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But is this dominant narrative faithful to events as 
they truly occurred? It is too early to say. Historians 
in fifty or one hundred years will revise the dominant 
version of the peace process and provide a different 
account or accounts. They will be able to place the 
peace process in its global and socio-cultural context, 
and in the long-trends of history. They will be able to 
disaggregate the truly significant events and processes 
from the welter of events and ‘historic moments’ that 
characterised the peace process. They will also have 
access to some of the documents (particularly the 
intelligence documents) that are not yet in the public 
domain. The implication of this instant – or perhaps 
premature – history of the peace process is that may 
be at risk of drawing lessons from an inaccurate 
account of the peace process. 
Certainly, the accepted script is probably too much 
focused on the elite processes, the crucial hours 
in Castle Buildings, the set-piece meetings and 
key documents. As in much history, the social, the 
economic, the female, and the non-elite risks will, with 
historical distance, be recognised as under-reported 
and under-valued. These multiple histories of 
everyday stories and perceptions formed 
a vital part of the peace process, 
particularly in terms of providing an environment of 
resistance and enablement. The dominant narrative 
has an emphasis on the making of peace through elites 
rather than the more general reception, consumption, 
and subversion of that peace. Although we talk about 
a peace ‘process’, the accepted version of the peace 
seems to characterise the peace process as a series of 
episodes and key events rather than as a long-term 
process or series of processes. There is a danger that 
we are equipped with inaccurate textbooks and we 
may not be in the best position to learn lessons. 
A VERY DIFFERENT CONTEXT
We should be in no doubt that Northern Ireland presents 
a very different case than most other contemporary civil 
wars. As a result, we must be cautious about proffering 
lessons or encouraging mimicry. The Northern Ireland 
state did not collapse in terms of economic or social 
provision. The collapse of such public health and 
sanitation systems has been the big killer in the civil 
wars such as those in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo or Somalia in the past two decades. Northern 
Ireland has been blessed by first-rate healthcare and 
infrastructure. Moreover, there were no massive 
Northern Ireland remains 
deeply divided and sectarian, 
and the reason for peace 
is more that terrorism was 
contained by the state, the 
terrorists were practical and 
wanted momentum, and 
terrorist-related politicians 
therefore sought a Plan B of 
peace-process politics when 
the Plan A of violence did not 
produce the desired results.
 
 
DEBUNKING 
THE PEACE 
PROCESS 
Richard English
In fact, most victims and  the 
circumstances of their deaths 
are forgotten.  Remembering 
the atrocity of such conflicts 
(and not euphemizing them) 
is a vital aspect of responding 
to terrorism, failing to do so 
runs the risk of encouraging 
more terrorism in the future.
1 2PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND DID NOT 
COME AS A RESULT OF 
RECONCILIATION. 
CONTRARY TO MUCH 
ASSUMPTION, NORTHERN 
IRELAND IS NOT A PLACE 
WHERE TOO MUCH IS 
REMEMBERED. 
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numbers of displaced persons. The casualty rate was 
low in comparison to other civil wars, and all sides used 
some measure of restraint. Northern Ireland occupies 
a very rich part of the world and is a member of the 
European Union. It is the only conflict that I know 
of where Marks & Spencer stayed open throughout. 
Not only does Northern Ireland present a very different 
context than many other conflict contexts, it was also 
treated very differently by the key power-holders. We 
can see this by contrasting British government policies 
towards Afghanistan and Iraq with those towards 
Northern Ireland. Courtesy of its extended peace 
process, Northern Ireland has experienced ‘liberal 
peace-lite’ or a generous and largely consensual 
form of peacemaking based on negotiation, electoral 
endorsement and a good dose of Keynesianism. Money 
and attention were lavished on Northern Ireland 
and its peace process. The process was not without 
coercion, but this coercion – even the worst of the 
British government’s outrages – pales in comparison 
with British government activities in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Here the version of ‘peacemaking’ took the 
form of regime change by force, military occupation, 
the imposition of a government (later endorsed 
by elections), and a major international project to 
re-orient the society, polity, and economy. The ferocity 
of this ‘peacemaking’ project is evidenced by the 
fact that British troops fired just under four million 
bullets in a year in the 2006-2007 in Afghanistan’s 
Helmand Province. 
What is remarkable is that the same British 
government, and often the same ministers and 
policymakers, were involved in the disbursement of 
such wildly schizophrenic variants of ‘peacemaking’. 
The successive British administrations seemed unable, 
or unwilling, to draw lessons from the Northern Ireland 
experience and apply them to Iraq or Afghanistan. 
The exceptionalism of Northern Ireland – as a context 
and in terms of its treatment – means that it is 
prudent to be cautious when drawing comparison. 
HAS THE WORLD MOVED ON FROM PEACE 
PROCESSES? 
In 2009 only one peace agreement was reached in a 
civil war situation, the Ihussi Accord in Congo. It may 
be that we live in a post-peace process era, or in an era 
in which there is little room for inclusive and patient 
peace processes. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
3 4NORTHERN IRELAND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE VICTORY OF 
EXTREMISM. 
In fact, during most of the conflict neither 
community had a majority in it which 
supported terrorism. It was only after the 
IRA effectively ended their war against the 
British state that their party, Sinn Fein, 
became the dominant voice of Northern 
Irish nationalism. Before that, repeatedly 
and emphatically, the non-violent SDLP 
easily outpolled Sinn Fein year after year.
NO TERRORIST GROUP IN NORTHERN 
IRELAND ENDED THE CONFLICT 
GETTING WHAT THEY WANTED.
Terrorists did accomplish certain second-
order gains (greater influence for their 
political party; greater personal influence 
and even wealth) but in terms of the 
achievement of central, strategic goals, 
terrorism did not work very well in 
Northern Ireland.   
Richard English is Director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political 
Violence at the University of St Andrews. More detail on these arguments can be 
found in his recent book, Terrorism: How To Respond (Oxford University Press, 2010).
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records an average of nine peace accords annually in 
the period since 1989, but that figure seems to have 
sharply declined. Whether this is a blip or part of a 
wider trend is hard to tell at this stage. 
The argument advanced in this brief article is that 
the Northern Ireland peace process was something 
of an outlier, or an atypical peace process, in that 
it was more inclusive and more embedded in the 
rights agenda than many other peace processes. Of 
course, the Northern Ireland peace process was not 
completely inclusive, and sometimes patience was 
in short supply. However, overall, the peace process 
was based on the notion of including those who had 
the capacity to wreck peace from without. Tony Blair 
famously told Sinn Féin that ‘the settlement train’ 
would leave without them. It didn’t. Blair and the 
others waited for Sinn Féin. There were countless other 
attempts to make the peace process inclusive, and 
seemingly endless waiting for various constituencies to 
be consulted. The result was a big tent peace process. 
It wasn’t exactly ‘touchy feely’, and the shadow 
of violence was often nearby, but it was a peace 
process in which consent and inclusion played very 
significant roles. 
Northern Ireland’s ‘big tent’ peace process can be 
contrasted with contexts that were much more hostile 
to peace initiatives. The first decade of the twenty-
first century has witnessed many cases where one 
party in a conflict has sought to secure unilateral 
victory by violence or authoritarian suppression: Sri 
Lanka, southern Thailand, Burma, Darfur, Afghanistan, 
North-West Pakistan, various parts of India, Chechnya, 
Israel/Palestine, Yemen, and the list goes on. In some 
of these cases, such as Sri Lanka or Israel/Palestine, 
there was a nod to a peace process or some sort of 
negotiated settlement. But often this was subterfuge, 
or a cover for military action. 
There are two interesting contextual factors that have 
made suppression an easier option than negotiation 
and may suggest that Northern Ireland is an outlier 
with limited comparative value. The first is the global 
War on Terror, which is still being waged although the 
term is no longer common currency. This gave cover to 
many authoritarian regimes to label their opponents 
as ‘terrorists’ and use violent rather than negotiated 
means to attempt to ‘solve’ their conflict. British and 
US involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan meant that 
regimes can laugh off lectures on human rights abuses. 
The War on Terror meant a lessening emphasis on the 
Clintonian doctrine of democratisation, and instead 
placed a greater emphasis on the stabilisation of states 
(as a bulwark against ‘terrorism’) and the securitisation 
of humanitarianism, development, and peacebuilding. 
The second reason that might make suppression more 
attractive than negotiation is that investment from 
China – and other locations including Saudi Arabia 
– means that a number of developing countries can 
re-orient themselves eastwards towards the boom 
economies, rather than west towards gloomy lectures 
on human rights and aid that is tied to a multitude 
of conditions. As Mark Duffield has observed, the 
Sudanese government has been able to frustrate 
western attempts to intervene over Darfur in part 
because it has been cushioned by Chinese investment. 
Sri Lanka was able to afford to win its war against 
the Tamil Tigers via cheap money from China and 
the international markets that enabled it to rearm. 
It was able to insulate itself against complaints on 
human rights from western INGOs and governments 
because they had lost their financial leverage over 
it. In May 2011, just as the LSE IDEAS event was 
looking at lessons learned from the Northern Ireland 
peace process, the Sri Lankan army was hosting its 
own lessons learned conference. Forty-two countries 
signed up to hear how to win an insurgency. It is 
worth stressing that Sri Lanka ‘won’ its war in 2009 
through the suppression of human rights and a 
sustained military offensive. A combination of the 
international and domestic contexts made this option 
more palatable to the Sri Lankan regime than another 
round of negotiations.
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ARE THERE ANY LESSONS?
So far the tenor of this article has been sceptical in 
relation to lessons from the Northern Ireland peace 
process. Yet there is one lesson that does deserve to 
be aired, and that is that a peace process is possible, 
even if the circumstances seem unpropitious. The 
Northern Ireland of the late 1980s was characterised 
by a palpable despair. The conflict was described as 
‘frozen’, ‘cyclical’ and ‘pointless’. Few people, if any, 
could see a way out of the stalemate. Yet within half a 
decade a feasible peace process was up and running. 
A conflict that was seen as ‘intractable’ seemed to 
offer the possibility of movement. This movement 
was not inevitable and was rarely achieved without 
controversy. But the very idea that a peace process 
was possible, and that it could have a tangible impact 
on the ground, was important and is likely the most 
important lesson that Northern Ireland has to offer.  
Richard English
